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This paper examines how the quality of exports depends on relative country size and its 
remoteness. Specific transportation cost is the key variable in our analysis as it gives rise to the 
Alchian-Allen effect. In the model, we allow for endogenous quality choice by a producer 
serving many international locations. Higher quality comes at higher marginal cost of 
production, but can be delivered at the same absolute, and thus proportionally lower, 
transportation cost to a given destination. Our model complements the well documented demand-
side response to the distribution of transportation costs (known as the Alchian-Allen effect) by 
the supply side response. We show that, ceteris paribus, equilibrium quality decreases in the 
domestic country size and increases in remoteness from foreign markets. This happens because a 
larger portion of the demand is affected by the Alchian-Allen effect for smaller countries’ 
producers, and the Alchian-Allen effect is stronger for remote countries. We confirm our 
predictions empirically on a detailed product level dataset of all exporters worldwide into a 
sample of Latin American importers.   
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1.  Introduction 
In the ‘new trade’ literature transportation cost is typically expressed in ad-valorem terms 
as a Samuelson’s iceberg.  Traditionally, this choice is justified on the grounds of analytical 
simplicity and limited empirical evidence on the functional form of transportation cost.  Recent 
empirical literature, however, clearly shows that the transportation cost is not ad-valorem. A 
significant component of the transportation cost is instead specific1.  Moreover, Hummels and 
Skiba argue theoretically and show empirically that the iceberg assumption is also not 
innocuous: the specific component changes the relative prices of traded goods and shifts relative 
demand in favor of the higher quality goods consistent with the Alchian-Allen conjecture.  As a 
result, the relative demands across importers are not symmetric, and importers choose different 
relative quantities from a given exporter. 
While the Alchian-Allen conjecture is about the demand-side response to the specific 
transportation cost, this paper complements the analysis by modeling the supply-side response.   
Does the specific nature of transportation cost affect the quality of a nation’s output and exports?  
In a simple general equilibrium model of trade with endogenous quality choice, we show that a 
specific transport cost provides incentives to produce higher quality goods, even though higher 
quality is more costly to produce, and thus higher priced.  This is due to the fact that the 
delivered relative price of the higher priced goods is lower than the domestic one.  As first 
pointed out by Alchian and Allen, this creates an incentive to “ship the good apples out.”  We 
show that if the exports to output ratio decreases with country size, firms in smaller countries 
have stronger incentives to “grow better apples,” since a larger share of their output faces a 
transport cost.  Our theory can be anecdotally intuited by notorious examples of small countries 
specializing in high quality goods such as Swiss watches, Belgian chocolate, Swedish cars, or 
Vietnamese Kopi Luwak coffee.   
In the empirical exercise we use 6 digit HS classification product level imports into a 
sample of Latin American countries from all exporters worldwide between 1999 and 2002 to 
relate quality of exports to country size and its remoteness. We show that, ceteris paribus, 
smaller and more remote countries tend to export higher priced goods. Both findings are 
consistent with our theory of Alchian-Allen effect with endogenous quality choice. The effect of 
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 See, for example, Hummels and Skiba (2004), Hummels, Lugovskyy, and Skiba (2009), Irrarazabal, Moxnes, and 
Opromolla (2010).  
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remoteness on quality is nuanced. On the one hand, the producers in remote countries face lower 
foreign demand.  On the other hand, the relative demands are more distorted by high 
transportation cost.  
Our work contributes to several literatures.  First, it is closely related to the within-
industry specialization literature.  Krugman (1979, 1980) describes how specialization can occur 
within increasing returns to scale industry or even within a differentiated product.  An important 
implication of his seminal work lies in a formal description of the home market effect.  It states 
that specialization due to increasing returns can be detected by the relationship between the 
quantity of exports and the market size.  The more than proportional correlation between exports 
and size indicates that larger countries specialize in the increasing returns sector.  Further 
pursuing this line of research, Schott (2004) and Hallak (2003) detect substantial within-product 
specialization and point out that richer countries specialize in higher quality products.  In 
particular, Schott’s results highlight considerable vertical, international specialization even 
within the most narrowly defined product categories.  We extend this literature by showing that 
the within-product and within-industry vertical specialization depend on the country size and 
remoteness. 
Second, we contribute to the literature on the Market Potential Index (henceforth MPI) 
and trade, the foundations of which can be traced back to the seminal work of Harris (1954).  
Harris emphasized the fact that the demand for goods produced in a given location is the sum of 
demands in other locations, which are the functions of the purchasing power in these locations, 
weighted by transport costs.2  The MPI is widely used in the fast growing economic geography 
literature (see, e.g., Davis and Weinstein, 1999, 2003; Hanson and Xiang, 2004; Hanson, 2005), 
which is based on the idea that the firm’s decisions depend on the location and size of the firm’s 
customers and suppliers.  We are the first to decompose the MPI into domestic and foreign 
components and separate the effect of each of the components on the quality choice. In 
particular, if a single quality is to be chosen for all markets, quality then increases in the 
domestic GDP but decreases in the GDP of the rest of the world.  Furthermore, domestic 
transportation cost increases the optimal quality, while the effect of the international 
transportation cost might have ambiguous effect on quality.    
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 While until recently the market potential function was rather ad-hoc, Fujita et al. (1999) provided micro 
foundations for the market-potential index by showing how it can be derived from formal spatial models.   
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Third, we contribute to the quality and productivity discussion in the heterogeneous firms 
framework.  Melitz (2003) assumes away quality differentiation, which then makes the lowest 
(marginal) cost firms the most productive firms.  Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) challenge this 
assumption and propose a variant of Melitz model in which higher productivity firms are both 
higher cost and higher quality firms.    Empirically they show that the factory prices of exported 
goods increase with the distance to the destination.   Following Hummels and Skiba (2004), we 
show that the positive correlation between the distance to the destination and export prices can 
be due to the Alchian-Allen effect under a constant set of exporters, rather than the self-selection 
of higher quality firms.  If the fixed cost of exporting are exporter-specific (rather than 
destination market specific), a proper test of the Baldwin-Harrigan hypothesis, stemming from a 
multi-country extension of their model, is to find the effect of the exporter remoteness on the 
export prices.3    
Our model abstracts from the firm heterogeneity model because our focus is on the 
relative demands and not on the sorting of firms into exporters and non-exporters. The main 
theoretical mechanism in the models with heterogeneous firms is that the cost of exporting 
reduces the set of exporters. Depending on the relation between the profits and price, the 
exporters can be either the low or high cost producers. The nature of transportation costs and 
differences in relative demands for quality do not play a role. A notable exception is presented 
by Irarrazabal, Moxnes, Opromolla (2010) which  studies the distributional effects of specific 
trade cost. They find that the variation in distribution of firm export values is consistent with a 
fairly substantial specific trade cost. 
Recently, exporter’s quality choice has been studied by Verhoogen (2008). He analyzes 
quality upgrading among Mexican exporters to the US. The quality difference among exporters 
and non-exporters is driven by the American preference for quality and not the nature of 
transportation cost. Our empirical exercise allows for quality preference by high income 
countries, but the main focus is on transportation cost. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: theoretical framework is described in 
section 2, section 3 presents the empirical findings, and section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  Theoretical Framework 
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 We discuss the various alternatives of modeling the fixed costs of exporting in greater detail after Proposition 1. 
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We model the quality choice of two monopolists, which produce differentiated goods 
(one each) and face demands from  1,2,...,i I=  countries. The monopolists have to incur both 
production and shipping costs, and the chosen quality level is the same across all destinations.   
Similar to the Samuelson iceberg, the shipping prices are posted in ad-valorem terms,  however, 
the market values of the shipping prices (also referred to as “the tip of the iceberg”) are the same 
across goods and quality levels.  As a result, our model allows us to simultaneously distinguish 
between the Alchian-Allen effect and endogenous quality choice and preserve the analytical 
convenience of the iceberg transportation cost. 
  
2.1. Preferences and Production Function 
Preferences of a representative consumer in country i are defined over a numeraire good  
n and two types of differentiated goods, x and z: 
(1) ( ) ( )1 1
1 1
I I
i
i e ie e ie
e e i
nU x z
σ σ
σ σλ θ
γ
− −
= =
= + +∑ ∑      0,iγ > 1σ > ,  
where
 
eλ
 
and eθ are quality levels of goods x and z produced in country e; 
ni, xie, and zie are consumption levels of goods n, x, and z by a representative consumer in 
country i, where the origin of production of goods x and z is indexed by e.  
Labor is the only factor of production and is supplied inelastically.  There are Li consumers in 
country I, and each consumer is endowed with one unit of labor.  The numeraire sector is 
characterized by perfect competition and constant returns to scale.  One unit of labor can produce wi 
units of the numeraire in country i.  The numeraire is traded at zero cost.  We assume that the 
numeraire sector is large enough for both countries to have strictly positive output of the numeraire.  
The introduction of the numeraire in the model simplifies the balance of trade calculation and ties 
the wage to productivity in the numeraire sector.   
The rest of the model is set from a perspective of one country, Home, indexed by h.  For 
brevity, we mostly omit indexing producer-specific variables, since both of the producers of interest 
are located in Home. Differentiated goods are produced by monopolies.  In Home, the cost function 
is characterized by marginal labor requirements, a and b, which are functions of productivity 
parameters ( , , 0B α β > ) and chosen quality levels for goods x and z, correspondently:4  
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 A similar marginal cost function was first introduced by Flamm and Helpman (1987) and later used by Hummels 
and Klenow (2005).   
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(2) ( ) /a eλ αλ =
     
/b Bbθ β= .5 
Technologically quality is bounded from above and below for both types of differentiated goods, 
,λ λ λ ∈   , ,θ θ θ ∈   .  
 
2.2. Transportation Cost 
Similar to the standard Samuelson iceberg form, the transportation of a good requires a 
fraction of the good itself, however, we deviate from assuming the “tip of the iceberg” to be the 
same across goods.  Instead, we assume the price of transportation, calculated in monetary terms 
(at the market price of the transported good), to be the same across various goods and quality 
levels.  That is, while producers of apples or oranges pay for transportation in units of those 
goods, the dollar value of the transportation price is the same across all types of apples and 
oranges.  The difference between the traditional Samuelson iceberg and the modified iceberg is 
illustrated in Figure 1.  
Let us set the absolute (in monetary terms) price of transportation between Home and a 
given destination i to be ti.  Now, the transportation cost expressed in ad-valorem iceberg terms 
will obviously depend on the price of the transported good, while the price itself might depend 
on the transportation cost.  We assume that the shippers post their (ad-valorem) prices first.  For 
a given good x of quality level λ, transporters calculate the expected factory-gate price6 
( )0E p λ    and for every destination i they post the value of the iceberg ( )iτ λ  such that the 
market value of the tip of the iceberg evaluated at the expected price is ti: 
(3) ( )( ) ( )01i iE p tτ λ λ− =   . 
Producers then take ad-valorem rates as given.  Similarly, to deliver a unit z of quality θ , 
transporters require ( )( )1iρ θ −  units of the corresponding quality, such that 
(4) ( )( ) ( )01i iE q tρ θ θ− =   , 
where [ ]0E q  is the expected factory gate prices of good z, quality θ .  The two-stage price 
setting mechanism is also illustrated in Figure 2.   
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 Additional multiplier B is added to the functional form of the marginal cost of good z, b, to allow for differences in 
the magnitudes of marginal costs a and b in equilibrium.  
6
 Factory-gate prices are the prices charged under zero transportation cost.  
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 Consistent with the empirical literature on international shipping we assume that, for a 
given exporter, transportation cost increases in the distance to the destination: 
(4) i jt t>  if and only if  i jdist dist> , 
where disti and distj  are the distances from Home to countries i and j, respectively.  
  
2.3. Market Equilibrium 
Monopolists located in Home face demands for their products from multiple countries 
and maximize their respective profit functions:   
(5) ( )
1
I
X i i i
i
X p w api τ
=
= −∑
  
( )
1
I
Z i i i
i
Z q w bpi ρ
=
= −∑ , 
where Xi and Zi are the quantities of goods x and z delivered to country i.  
From the first order conditions with respect to the quantity shipped to each destination,  
(6) ( ) 0iX i i i
i i
dpd p w a X
dX dX
pi
τ= − + =
 
( ) 0iZ i i i
i i
dqd q w b Z
dZ dZ
pi ρ= − + =
 
1,2,..., ,i I=
 
we find the optimal delivered prices to every location i : 
(7) 
1
i
i
wap σ τ
σ
=
−
    1
i
i
wbq σ ρ
σ
=
−
    
1,2,...,i I= . 
The expected factory-gate prices for goods x and z are then 
(8)  [ ] ( )/0 1E p weλ ασ σ= −   [ ] ( )/0 1E q wBeθ βσ σ= − .  
By plugging these results into equations (3) and (4) we find the equilibrium ad-valorem shipping 
prices set by transporters:  
(9) ( ) / 1i it e λ ατ λ −= +
   
( ) 1 / 1i it B e θ βρ θ − −= +  
Note that even though we allowed for market segmentation, in equilibrium, the f.o.b. prices are 
the same across destinations, they do not depend on the shipping charges, and the “no arbitrage” 
condition holds.  Thus, despite the specific nature of transportation cost, the analytical 
convenience of the traditional Samuelson iceberg is preserved. 
The first order condition with respect to the quality level of good x is given by 
( )
1
0,
I
i i iX
i i i i i i
i i
dX dX dd dap w a X w a
d d dp d d
τpi ξ τ ξ τλ λ λ λ
=
     
= + − + − + =     
    
∑
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where .i i ii
i
dp dc dp d
dc d d d
τξ λ τ λ= +   Given the utility function (1), equilibrium prices (6), and 
transportation costs (9), the above formula can be simplified to: 
(10) 
1
1 0,
I
iX
i
i
d
aw X
d
τpi
λ λ α
=
 
= − = 
 
∑  
The equilibrium quality level is then:  
(11) * .i ii
ii
X
X
τλ α
 
=  
  
∑
∑
 
Note that both Xi  and iτ depend on quality, and thus equation (11) does not provide an explicit 
solution for the profit-maximizing quality.  Nevertheless, it is a useful and intuitive result:  the 
equilibrium quality level is a weighted average of transportation costs scaled by technological 
parameter α, where the weights are the corresponding quantities. 
In interior equilibrium, the ratio of marginal utilities for any two goods equals to the ratio 
of their prices.  By applying this condition to the numeraire and good x, 
1
iei i
ie i
pdU dU
dx dn
= , we get 
( ) 1 11i i i ix x p
σ
σ
σγ λ
σ
−
−
−
= , 
from which the export per consumer to country i is  ( )( ) 11 /i i ix pσ σ σγ σ σ λ − −= − , and the 
corresponding export per country-importer is 
(12) ( )( ) 11 / .i i i iX L pσ σ σγ σ σ λ − −= −  
After plugging the above expression into (11) and rearranging terms we get: 
(13) * .i i i ii
i i ii
L
L
σ σ
σ σ
γ τ τλ α
γ τ
−
−
=
∑
∑
 
As indicated by the second order conditions,  
(14) ( )
2
1 /1 1
2
1 1
i i ii
i
d
w e L
d
σ λ ασ σ σ σpi σ σλ γ τλ α ατ λ α
− −
− − −
 
= − − 
 
∑  
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there exists a range of parameters for which (13) is profit-maximizing quality.7  In the 
comparative statics section we will focus on the interior equilibrium.  In the case of the corner 
solution (either *λ λ=  or *λ λ= ), marginal variation in parameters will not affect the optimal 
quality choice.   
The same derivations and discussion applies to the optimal quality choice for good z, 
with the optimal quality level being: 
(15) * .i i i ii
i i ii
L
L
σ σ
σ σ
γ ρ τ
θ β
γ ρ
−
−
 
=  
  
∑
∑
 
 
2.3. Predictions 
We start by showing that the standard Alchian-Allen effect holds in our model. 
Proposition 1 (Alchian-Allen effect): In equilibrium for a given exporter, a larger share of the 
more expensive good is shipped to a more distant location.   
Proof:  By applying equation (12) to both x and z, we can find the equilibrium ratio of the two 
goods shipped from a given exporter to country i: 
( )
( )
/ 1 /1 1
1 1 / /
1
1
ii i
i i i
Be t B eZ q
X p e t e
σθ α θ βσ σ σ
σ σ σ λ α λ α
θ θ
λ λ
−
− −
− − −
− − −
−
 +
 = =
+  
 
Next we calculate how this ratio compares between destinations i and j:  
1 / 1 /
/ /
1 1
 
1 1
j ji i
i j j i
Z t B eZ t B e
X X t e t e
σθ β θ β
λ α λ α
− −
− −
− −
 + +
==  
+ +  
 
Now if z is a higher marginal cost good ( / /Be eθ β λ α> ), the ratio is greater than one if and only if 
i jt t> , which according to equation (4) is possible if and only if country i is further away from 
Home than country j.  ■ 
 Next we show how the size and internal shipping cost of country-exporter affect quality. 
Proposition 2: Quality decreases in the internal (domestic) transportation cost and increases in 
the purchasing power of the country-exporter.   
Proof: The first result follows directly from applying the implicit derivation to equation (10): 
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 An obvious case is for { }min ,iσ τ< but the range is much broader than that.  
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( )
*
1
1 1 0.
*
h
I
h i i i
h h h
i i ih w Const
d L
w
d wL
σ σ
σ σλ τ γ τ σ σγ τ λ α ατ ατ α λ
−
−
=
=
  
= − − − − <   
   
∑ 8 
Intuitively, quality is a weighted average of transportation cost (scaled byα ).  When we 
increase any of the bilateral transportation costs, the direct effect on quality is positive.  The 
indirect effect of higher transportation is negative for many foreign destinations since higher 
transportation cost decreases the share of goods exported.  For the domestic market, however, the 
indirect effect is also positive, since it decreases the share of output consumed domestically (and 
thus increases the export share).  
The second result also follows from applying the implicit derivation to equation (10): 
( )
*
/
1
1 1 1/ 11 0.
I
i i i
h h h
ih i ih
d LL e w
dt
σ σ
σ σ λ αλ γ τσ σ σσ γ τ
ατ λ ατ ατ α λ
−
− −
=
   
−
= − − − − − >   
   
∑ 9
 
■ 
 
Finally, we will examine how quality reacts to the remoteness of the country-exporter.   
For this purpose we decompose the transportation cost parameter to foreign destinations, ti (i≠h), 
into two components10. The first component, the overall exporter’s remoteness index R, is a 
measure of remoteness consistent with the Market Potential Index measure, widely used in the 
economic geography literature (see, e.g., Hanson and Xiang 2004):  
(16) ( ) 0.92 .
ii h
i ii h
GDP
R
GDP Dist
≠
−
≠
=
∑
∑
  
The second component is the destination-specific multiplier, it : 
(17) .iit Rt= 
         
Proposition 3: Remoteness increases the average transportation cost to foreign destinations 
which creates stronger incentives to upgrade quality. At the same time, higher transportation 
costs make goods less competitive on foreign markets, which decreases the volume of exports, 
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 Note that from equation (11) * i i ii iX Xλ α τ= ∑ ∑  , optimal quality is a weighted average of transportation cost 
(scaled by α ).  Thus ( )* min i hλ ατ ατ> =  and the expression in the round brackets is positive.  The denominator is 
the second derivative of profit with respect to quality and is negative for the interior equilibrium. 
9
 The same argument as in the previous footnote applies here. 
10
 Such breakdown of the transportation cost can arise from  a hub-and-spoke geography. R is the exporter's distance 
to the hub and it  is the distance from the hub to the destination. 
10 
 
and thus decreases the optimal quality level.   The total effect is ambiguous and depends on the 
parameters of the model.  
Proof: After applying the implicit derivation to equation (10): 
(18) ( )
* 2
2
1 1 11 ,
* *
X
i i i i
i h i
d dL
ddR R
σ σλ σ piγ τ τ
ατ λ σλ λ
−
≠
 
= − − − + 
 
∑
 
which can be both positive and negative.11 ■ 
Intuitively, the direct effect of remoteness (higher transportation costs to all foreign 
destinations) provides an incentive to choose higher quality.  However, the indirect effect (lower 
share of output devoted for exports) makes firms more oriented on domestic market and 
consequently favors choosing lower quality.  The higher the elasticity of substitution, the more 
sensitive foreign markets are to changes in prices and the stronger the indirect effect.  
 
2.5. Discussion 
As follows from Proposition 1, an exporter ships a higher quality mix of goods to more 
distant locations, even when its set of firms and quality levels are fixed.   This provides an 
alternative explanation for the “larger distance – higher export price” empirical finding of 
Baldwin and Harrigan (2007), who attribute it to the self-selection of higher quality exporters to 
more distant locations.12   
 Note also that while theoretical predictions of Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) are based on 
the two-country model, their empirical exercise involves multiple countries.  The transition from 
the two-country model to the multiple-country empirics crucially depends on the nature of the 
fixed costs of exporting.   Using bilateral distances in the empirical part is consistent with 
assuming that the fixed costs of exporting are destination-specific. 13   The set of exporters in this 
case will vary across destination.  The common fixed cost of exporting, on the other hand, will 
result in the set of exporters being constant across destinations.  It will depend, though, on the 
remoteness of a country-exporter from all foreign markets.  The empirical literature on the nature 
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 For example, the expression in equation (18) is negative (positive) for sufficiently high (low) values of σ.  
12
 Note that Baldwin and Harrigan assume traditional iceberg trade barriers and according to their model, tariffs 
should have the same (positive) effect on prices as distance.  However, as shown by Hummels and Skiba (2004), 
tariffs actually have the opposite (negative) effect on prices. This supports the hypothesis that distance increases 
export prices due to the specific nature of transportation cost, which triggers the Alchian-Allen effect.  
13
 Theoretical examples of modeling destination-specific fixed cost of exporting include Baldwin and Forslid 
(2006), Chaney (2008), and Ardelean and Lugovskyy (2010).   
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of the fixed cost of exporting is extremely scarce,14 which prevents us from picking one of the 
alternatives with certainty.  If one, however, allows for the fixed cost of exporting to contain 
both the exporter and destination-specific components, the interpretation of the effect of 
remoteness on the average price of exports can be extended to the heterogeneous firms 
framework.  In particular, the Baldwin and Harrigan hypothesis of higher quality – higher 
productivity will be supported if remoteness increases the average price of exports. 
 
3. Empirics 
3.1.  Data 
Our data sample comes from the BTI trade database for 1999-2002.  We have multiple 
Latin American importers (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay) and therefore 
many importer-exporter pairs.  We employ data on Latin American imports in each year t, 
disaggregated by importer i, exporter k, product s (HS 6 digit data which includes roughly 5,000 
product categories) and transport mode m (air, ocean). We observe value, weight, duties paid, 
and shipment charges for each i-k-s-m-t observation. We only employ ocean shipping data, and 
hereafter drop the mode m subscript. 
The data on GDP per capita and population size are from the World Development 
Indicators (1999-2002) and bilateral great circle distances between capital cities of trading 
partners are from Head and Mayer (2002). 
 
3.2.  Empirical specification 
Our identification of quality in trade is based on the presumption that prices contain 
information about the quality. Theory links observed average prices to quality through the cost 
function, the price equation, and relative quantities.  
i i
i i i
i i i i
X Zp p q
X Z X Z
= +
+ +
 
Combining the expressions for quality and cost with the pricing equation we get the 
following expression for the average price: 
                                                 
14
 The only known empirical test of whether the fixed cost is destination or exporter-specific is performed by 
Hanson and Xiang (2008).  They find that in the US movie industry, the fixed cost of exporting is rather exporter-
specific, but acknowledge that the movie industry is very particular and that this is not necessarily universal across 
sectors.   
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/ //1
.
1 1 / 1 /
i i
i
i i i i
Z Xp w e Be
Z X Z X
λ α θ βσ
σ
 
= + 
− + + 
 
Close inspection of the average price equation reveals that the average price depends on cost 
shifters, quality composition, and optimal quality levels. The cost shifters enter as wage and will 
be approximated by the exporters GDP per capita. Exporter's income is likely to pick up some 
variation in the quality productivity parameter. The quality composition effect due to the 
Alchian-Allen effect works through the shares of goods x and z in a way described by 
Proposition 1. We follow closely the instrumenting strategy used by Hummels and Skiba (2004) 
using distances and trade volumes to instrument for the specific component of the transportation 
cost. The main interest of our investigation lies however in the quality choice. Theory suggests a 
set of plausible exporter specific exogenous quality shifters. 
In order to arrive at the estimating equation we use the following procedure. First, we 
condition on cost and the Alchian-Allen quality compositional effect by including exporter’s 
GDP per capita and properly instrumented transportation cost. Second, we identify theoretically 
important exporter specific exogenous size and geography shifters. Third, we construct 
specification based on a reduced form approximation. And finally, we condition on other known 
quality shifters not included in our model. 
 From equations (11) and (15) the optimal quality is a function of the exports weighted ad-
valorem equivalent of the transportation cost. The combined summation terms in both equations 
are a function of the relative size of transportation cost and thus are determined by quality. 
However the quality choice is driven by some factors that shift the combined term and are 
outside the firms control. Those are relative country size and geographical variables. We have 
explored these connections theoretically and verified that the size and geography variables have 
the predicted effect under a reasonable set of assumptions. With the help of some analytical 
simplifications we were able to find closed form solutions for quality and solve for the first and 
second order conditions. Unfortunately there is no closed form structural solution for estimating 
equation and therefore we rely on the first order logarithmic approximation to construct the 
estimating equation. 
 Chief among the size variables is country’s own size. Domestic GDP determines relative 
size of the domestic demand. Notice that in our model the effect of size is very different from the 
home market effect. Home market effect works by making a location with larger demand more 
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attractive for the increasing returns to scale firm. Domestic size in our model affects the share of 
the total output sold with the lower distortion due to specific transportation cost. The basic 
identifying assumption is that the international shipping has to incur domestic shipping and the 
international shipping and thus domestic demand for home goods is less distorted by the specific 
transportation cost. One can easily find counter examples of producers in Seattle, Washington, 
for whom shipping to Vancouver, British Columbia, is probably cheaper than shipping to Miami, 
Florida. Such situations are however more likely in geographically large countries with larger 
domestic transportation cost. 
There is an obvious role for internal distance. A producer in a large country needs to 
incur higher transportation cost to reach domestic consumers and thus domestic consumers also 
face some distortion in relative demands due to transportation cost. We know very little about the 
exact size of the intra-national trade costs. The proxy for internal trade costs from the literature 
on home market and market potential index is the land area. A producer in a larger country other 
things being equal incurs a higher transportation cost to reach the consumers. There are 
potentially numerous ways to improve on this variable by taking into account concentration of 
population, average population density, features of geography that may affect special 
concentration of demand. We leave those considerations for future work and choose the most 
commonly used measure. Using land area makes our results more compatible with the market 
size variables used in the MPI literature.  
Another exogenous quality shifter is the position of a country relative to the rest of the 
world's demand or its remoteness. Remoteness is simple to model but hard to measure because it 
is simultaneously a function of geography and market sizes. For example, intuitively we think 
that South African is more remote than Belgium because Belgium is close to the largest 
European countries while South Africa is far from all major large markets. A natural candidate 
for the remoteness variable from the MPI literature is the GDP weighted distance to the foreign 
markets. This variable is inversely related to the foreign portion of the market potential index.  
Our model suggests that the remoteness affects quality in two separate ways. First, the 
market potential of the rest of the world can be thought of as the size of the foreign demand. 
Larger foreign demand means that a higher share of output is sold subject to the non-iceberg 
transportation costs. This gives producers incentive to upgrade quality. But at the same time the 
market potential of the rest of the world is also a measure of remoteness. An exporter that is 
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further away from its importers has a stronger incentive to produce higher quality because the 
relative demands are more biased in favor of the high quality due to higher transportation cost. 
Consider the following thought experiment. Two countries with the same GDP have the same 
GDP of the rest of the world. However, a producer in a remote country would face a lower 
foreign demand measured by ROWktMP  than a producer in a centrally located country. This creates 
incentive for the centrally located producer to increase quality. The expected size on the foreign 
demand variable is therefore positive. At the same time, the producer in the remote country has 
incentive to upgrade quality due to costly transportation. In order to measure remoteness we 
scale GDP of the rest of the world by the foreign demand: /ROW ROWkt ktGDP MP . If a country is 
remote, the foreign market potential differs significantly from the size of the rest of the world. 
The effect of this variable on quality is also expected to be positive. The land area captures effect 
of internal distance. A producer in a larger country would face on average a larger non-iceberg 
transportation cost than a producer in a smaller country.  
It is likely that remoteness determines development and thus market size but at any given 
point in time we can treat them as unrelated from the standpoint of a given exporter of a given 
product. Figure 3 plots country size against its remoteness. The plot is suggestive that there is a 
sufficient amount of variation in the size and remoteness to identify separate effects. 
In our theory there is no place for importer's income. In theory we abstracted from 
importer's incomes by assumption to streamline the treatment of our main question. To hold 
other things constant we explicitly condition on the importer's GDP per capita in the estimation. 
Previous literature on quality and trade shows that income differences are a significant 
determinant of quality. Markusen (2010) offers a detailed overview of the related issues and 
explores implications of non-homothetic preferences for trade. Markusen sidesteps the issue of 
quality but to the extent that we rely on variation in prices to identify quality his paper is 
relevant. 
Our theory is about cross sectional differences. We treat time dimension with time fixed 
effects and time effects interacted with other fixed effects. 
Combining above considerations we arrive at the estimating equation: 
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3.3.  Results 
The results of the estimation are presented in Table 1.  The four specifications reported in 
four columns differ in the detail of the error component accounted by the fixed effects and by 
decomposition of the remoteness measure in the foreign demand and average distance 
components. The main message of the table is that we find broad support for our main theoretical 
hypotheses about the effect of size and remoteness on the price. As predicted quality decreases in 
the GDP of the domestic market: doubling the size of the domestic market decreases the factory 
gate price of exported goods by 6-7%.  There is a possibility that the larger domestic market 
allows for better utilization of the increasing returns to scale, which lowers the production cost 
and consequently the prices.  While we do not provide a direct test which would allow to 
distinguish between the two hypotheses, according to the lower production cost story, the 
proximity of the foreign markets should work in the same direction and lower the prices.  
Instead, we find that the proximity of the foreign market increases the prices, which contradicts 
the lower cost intuition. Specifications 3 and 4 reveal a weak but significantly positive effect of 
remoteness on quality implying that the quality upgrading effect of distorted demands dominates 
the effect of smaller foreign demand. When we include both the foreign demand and the 
remoteness the effect of remoteness becomes stronger by an order of magnitude because it is 
counter acted by the direct measure of the foreign demand which has predictably a strong 
positive effect..  The presence of the Alchian-Allen effect is confirmed by the positive “Freight 
rate” coefficients.  The magnitudes are similar to the results obtained by Hummels and Skiba 
(2004). 
Consistently with the Proposition 2, factory prices increase with the within-exporter 
transportation cost, approximated by the land area of the country-exporter. Per capita incomes of 
both importers and exporters are associated with higher quality. 
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4. Conclusions 
We find that when a good is exported by many countries, the average price of exports is 
lower for larger countries. We show how this link between the size and average price can arise 
from the interaction between the Alchian-Allen effect and the endogenous quality choice. The 
empirical results are consistent with our theoretical predictions.  Quality decreases in the market 
size and remoteness of the exporting country, while increases in the internal transportation cost 
(within the country-exporter) and the size and proximity of the foreign destinations.  
There could potentially be other reasons why large countries have lower export prices.  
Large countries might choose a “high fixed cost - low variable cost” technology due to the larger 
size of the domestic market.  Alternatively, importers might consider a country of origin as an 
additional factor of differentiation, which might force producers form large countries to charge 
lower export markups due to higher competition with similar varieties.  Unfortunately, with the 
data in hand, we are not able to test for the mechanism that lowers the export prices for large 
countries.   
A useful, though not central contribution, of this paper is the new way to model 
transportation cost that is price neutral but not quality neutral. This is a critical simplification that 
allows for analytical treatment of endogenous quality choice in the multi-country setting.  
In this paper we do not model a relation between elasticity of substitution and quality. 
The elasticities of substitution for high and low qualities are identical. This assumption of 
convenience is not always innocuous because it is the interaction between the iceberg 
transportation cost and elasticity that determine existence and relative strength of the Home 
market effect for high and low quality varieties. 
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Figure 1.  Samuelson Iceberg vs Modified Iceberg Transportation Cost. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Two-Stage Decision Making Process. 
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Transporters calculate the expected factory-gate prices for 
all goods and quality levels.   
They use this information to post the ad-valorem 
transportation price for each good such that for a given 
destination, the price of transportation expressed in dollar 
terms is the same across all goods.  
Stage 1. Transporters Stage 2. Producers 
Producers take the schedule of ad-
valorem transportation prices as given 
and choose the profit-maximizing 
quantities, prices and quality levels.  
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Figure 3. Variation in the exporter GDP and remoteness 
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Table 1. Effect of Relative Exporter Size on Quality of Exports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Exporter’s GDP -0.063 -0.06 -0.061 -0.062 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Rest of the World Market Potential  0.352 0.473 0.415 0.468 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
GDPROW /Market Potential ROW 0.406 0.535 0.474 0.529 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
Land area 0.051 0.053 0.051 0.053 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Freight charge per unit of weight 0.687 0.72 0.688 0.717 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Exporter’s GDP per capita 0.192 0.185 0.193 0.187 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Importer’s GDP per capita 0.201 0.055 0.2  
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)  
Fixed effect HS6 
HS6-
importer 
HS6-year 
HS6-
importer-
year 
No. groups 5,342 41,968 20,003 118,617 
No. obs 1,051,101 1,047,532 1,050,766 1,031,733 
Notes: 1) All coefficients are significant at 1% level; 2) All variables are in logarithms; 3) Robust standard errors are 
reported in brackets; 4) Freight charge per unit of weight is instrumented with the trade volume and distance; 5) 
Estimation is performed using xtivreg2 routine in STATA by Mark Schaffer. 
